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1. Introduction 
 
The First International Symposium on Informal Logic (FISIL)2 in 1978 was a key intellectual 
event to the community of argumentation scholars, along with the conference on argumentation 
by then Speech Communication Association (SCA) and American Forensic Association (AFA) 
held in Utah in 1979 and Dutch-Belgian Speech Communication Association’s (VIOT’s) special 
session on argumentation and rhetoric in 1978. While publication of key textbooks and journal 
articles predated the Symposium, it was this symposium that set up argumentative and 
intellectual space for then marginal pedagogical courses in the discipline of philosophy. Ralph H. 
Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (1980, pp. 25-26) clearly laid out a list of research agenda into 
which philosophers of informal logic and argumentation seriously inquired in later years. 
Michael Scriven (1980) made a strong case on pragmatic as well as philosophical significance of 
informal logic and challenged the prevailing common sense on formal logic. John Woods (1980) 
advanced a strong counter-statement that informal logic is nothing. The success and satisfaction 
of the Symposium was such that Johnson and Blair started Informal Logic Newsletter right after 
                                                 
1 This article is a revision of the paper presented at the OSSA 11 conference. Since this article deals with history of 
informal logic and argumentation, it is important to provide historically accurate information. Comments by J. 
Anthony Blair, Frans H. van Eemeren, Robert Ennis, and Michael Scriven right after the presentation, as well as the 
author’s interaction with David Zarefsky and David Hitchcock revealed some misunderstanding in the author’s 
historical descriptions. In light of these interactions with key people in the field, the author has decided to revise the 
original paper rather than write a response to their comments, as other participants of the conference normally do for 
the proceedings. 
2 While the symposium is now known as the First International Symposium on Informal Logic because of the 
proceedings edited by Blair and Johnson, the original title of the symposium was Symposium on Informal Logic. In 
the oral history interview with the author, Blair (2007b) does not clearly remember who added ‘first’ and 
‘international’ to the title of the proceedings. However, he thought there should be another symposium partly 
because he and Johnson started the newsletter and maintained communication with those interested in informal 
logic. 
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the Symposium and maintained the space on the paper medium. It was initially a forum to 
exchange ideas on how to teach undergraduate course on informal logic, but then gradually 
started dealing with theoretical issues such as induction-deduction distinction, principle of 
charity, or fallacy theory. Looking back, we can easily find positive and lasting consequences of 
the First Symposium that still guides our intellectual endeavors more than thirty five years later. 
While the author of the current article (Konishi 2009, 2010, forthcoming) or other 
scholars (Johnson and Blair 1980, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000; Godden, Groarke and Hansen 2011; 
Groarke 2011) have made several attempts to historicize the informal logic movement in the 
twentieth century, those historical narratives center on beginnings of the movement or 
achievements in theoretical development. In light of the lack of scholarship examining historical 
process through which key ideas and infrastructures are formed, it seems imperative that we 
attempt to offer a more in-depth historical account of the mid-1980s. Rather than provide account 
on theoretical development of informal logic in the 1980s, this article will call our attention to 
more historical process and infrastructural aspects of the informal logic movement and 
speculatively describe how and why several historical events occurred. In describing these key 
infrastructural aspects, the author depends on oral history interviews as well as archival research 
of published and unpublished materials.3 Section two of this paper will focus on the Second 
International Symposium on Informal Logic (SISIL). Section three will discuss conversion of 
Informal Logic Newsletter into a peer-review journal Informal Logic. Section four will direct our 
attention to a cognate area of inquiry on critical thinking and discuss the founding of AILACT 
(Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking). Section five will examine the link 
between informal logic and communication scholars and rhetoricians as well as 
Pragma-Dialecticians, with special emphasis on the International Conference on Argumentation 
held in Amsterdam in 1986. Section six will end this article with a short summation as well as 
future research agenda items. 
 
2. Second International Symposium on Informal Logic (SISIL) 
 
After Blair and Johnson published the proceedings of the First Symposium in 1980, they (1981b, 
p. 30) announced to convene the Second International Symposium on Informal Logic (SISIL) on 
Informal Logic Newsletter. They (1981c, p. 2) state that: 
 
(t)he time will be ripe for a review of the progress of the informal logic movement 
since the first Windsor symposium in June 1978. With two years’ lead time, we 
hope there will be ample opportunity for people to work up papers. We herewith 
issue the first call for papers. Papers on any and all topics related to the theory and 
teaching of informal logic are welcome. 4 
 
Neither Blair nor Johnson remembers who took the initiative, but they both remember 
                                                 
3 It must be noted that Informal Logic Newsletter and Informal Logic are now accessible online, but that 
announcement of symposium or conferences are not fully disclosed. In the author’s opinion, this is another piece of 
evidence showing that the community pays more attention to theoretical developments than historical formation of 
informal logic and argumentation. 
4 In volume 4.1 of the Newsletter, Blair and Johnson (1981e, p. 10) used the phrase “theory and teaching of 
informal logic/critical thinking.” The subtle change in the phrase implies that they distinguished informal logic and 
critical thinking, which would later become evident in forming Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking 
(AILACT). 
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communication with people in the scholarly community. Blair (2007a) recalls how people urged 
them to have another symposium: 
 
I think people began to contact us [Blair and Johnson] and said: “Are you guys 
gonna have another conference?” Or “Isn't it time to have another conference? 
Shouldn’t we…shouldn’t we see how the field is doing and see where we all are?” 
And, and, so we eventually said, “Sure, we will have another conference. We'll 
have another conference” So we, I guess we must have decided in ‘82, and so 
publicized it. The next conference was, I think, we had open call for papers.5 
 
While the FISIL consists of invited speakers, the SISIL features invited papers, 
contributed papers and workshops.6 The number of presentation was much larger than the 
previous symposium, increasing from eight to twenty six (twenty papers and six workshops). The 
increased presenters meant more diversified voices. Only Johnson and Blair and Scriven 
presented in both symposiums, and the other speakers came to the symposium through different 
routes. Among the new presenters at the Symposium, Perry Weddle (1979), Trudy Govier (1979a, 
1979b, 1980), David Hitchcock (1979, 1980), Robert Fogelin (1981), and John Hoaglund (1971) 
previously published their ideas in the Newsletter. Robert Pinto (1978) and Mark Weinstein 
(1982) had also written in the Newsletter, respectively reviewing Nicholas Rescher’s Dialectics 
and introducing a role of formal logic in logical thinking course. Both later develop a link 
between applied epistemology and informal logic. Robert Ennis, Richard Paul and John McPeck 
bridged informal logic and critical thinking. Persons like Maurice Finocchiaro and Christopher 
Tindale, who would later become powerful voices, also presented at the Symposium. In short, 
the field shows some growth over five years. 
As Blair and Johnson invited Scriven, an established philosopher of science, to the FISIL, 
they invited a prominent philosophical figure to the SISIL as a keynote speaker: Jaakko Hintikka. 
When asked about reasons to pick up Hintikka, Blair (2007b) tells the following story: 
 
(I)n selecting keynotes, we were trying to do - let’s see, several things. Uh, 
keynote speakers. We were trying to attract people to the conference, so if we had 
a prominent philosopher as a keynoter, that we felt that would attract people to 
come to the conference. We were trying to introduce prominent philosophers to 
the field in the hope of gaining interest in the field by prominent philosophers and 
spreading the word in the field of philosophy....certainly in those early days we 
were thinking in terms of philosophy exclusively. Later we’ve broadened our 
view. 
 Hintikka is someone who’d written about logic and various kinds of logics, 
and so we thought he would be interested. As I recall, his wife Merrill Hintikka 
had written...I’m having a recollection that she had written something – whether 
she’d written a textbook or written in this field, I’m not sure. Hintikka was a huge 
name in philosophy at that time. And still a prominent name, but – but maybe 
bigger then than he – I mean, now he’s an old man. But – but - so getting Hintikka 
was, we thought, a real coup – we’d go after a really, really dominant figure in the 
                                                 
5 Johnson (2007, March 8) also tells a similar story in the oral history interview with the author. 
6 While Blair and Johnson (1983[sic]b, p. 18) list these three categories, it is not clear who were invited speakers 
and contributors.  
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field. So it was largely a political move. 
 
Echoing Blair’s story, Johnson (2007) thought that it was an attempt to “have a keynoter who 
was really from outside our tradition.” In Johnson’s memory, Hintikka “was a bit more retiring, 
but nevertheless gave a fairly interesting keynote presentation” titled “Questioning as a 
Philosophical Method.”  
One reason for having Hintikka as a keynoter was to attract him to informal logic, but it 
was not a successful move. Looking back on Hintikka’s relations to informal logic, Blair (2007b) 
recalls as follows: 
 
We didn’t particularly expect that – you know, Hintikka hadn’t worked in 
informal logic. I mean since then, he – he subsequently wrote a textbook in, you 
know, in argumentation and introductory logic. So we, maybe, could take credit 
for interesting him in the field. But he’s been a critic of the field, but a 
sympathetic critic, I think. He wrote somewhere, I was reading, he wrote 
somewhere that he was sympathetic to what we were trying to do, but he didn’t 
think we should call it logic. So - I’m shrugging. 
 
Blair and Johnson’s attempt to engage a giant in philosophy did not work out; 
nevertheless, the SISIL observed some promising signs. As a convenor of the Symposium, Blair 
(2007a) was encouraged to see larger numbers of people and greater interest in theoretical issues 
at the SISIL. Turning our eyes to the list of problems and issues Johnson and Blair (1980, pp. 
25-26) offered in the proceedings of the FISIL, we find some of them discussed by the presenters 
at the SISIL: the theory of argument was discussed by Trudy Govier, Perry Weddle, and Seale 
Doss; the problem of assumptions and missing premises by David Hitchcock as well as James 
Gough and Christopher Tindale; the problem of context by Richard Paul; and the relationship of 
informal logic to other inquiries by George Yoos, Maurice Finocchiaro, and Thomas Schwartz. In 
addition to the theoretical issues participants discussed, the way in which they engaged in 
discussion also impressed Blair. 
 
The atmosphere, again, was friendly and cooperative, and I mean, people were 
quite willing to critique one another, but in a constructive, positive way. (Blair, 
2007b) 
 
The next two sections will focus on two important achievements, the journal Informal Logic and 
the formation of AILACT (Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking), and discuss 
their implications to the scholarly community of argumentation scholars. 
 
3. From Informal Logic Newsletter to peer-review journal Informal Logic 
 
One notable difference that separates the SISL from the FISIL and the TISIL was non-existence 
of proceedings in book form. For the FISIL Blair and Johnson (1980) published Informal Logic: 
The First International Symposium with Edgepress, a small publisher owned by Scriven. They 
(1994) published New Essays in Informal Logic – a collection of articles presented at the TISIL, 
using Informal Logic as a publisher. These two books helped informal logicians to reach out 
external communities, as clearly evidenced by Habermas’ (1981/1984, pp. 22-24) reference to 
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the proceedings of the FISIL in his Theory of Communicative Action. In light of the fact that the 
SISIL has no proceedings, can we conclude that it failed to promote informal logic compared 
with two other symposiums? The answer is partly yes because people interested in informal logic 
could not easily grasp developments of the field at the time in a single book. However, the 
answer is also no because of the journal Informal Logic. It could deliver key theoretical ideas 
with more frequency and in a timely manner. With two or three issues published per year, 
scholarly journals can create, maintain or develop theoretical inquiries within the community in a 
more time-sensitive manner than proceedings. For better understanding the journal Informal 
Logic as an intellectual infrastructure, we will pay attention to development of Informal Logic 
Newsletter, link it to the SISIL, and observe how the SISIL contributed to the development of the 
journal 
 
3.1. Theoretical turn of Informal Logic Newsletter 
 
As co-editors of the Newsletter Blair and Johnson made a series of subtle moves in the five-year 
span. In the very first issue of the Newsletter, they (1978, p. 1) acknowledge that informal logic 
means “many things to many people.” They state that their “conception is very broad and liberal, 
and covers everything from theoretical issues (theory of fallacy and argument) to practical ones 
(such as how best to display the structure of ordinary arguments) to pedagogical questions (how 
to design critical thinking courses; what sorts of material to use).” This balance among theory, 
practice, and pedagogy within informal logic changed over years. 
The first volume the Newsletter was almost exclusively pedagogical, publishing more 
passages for analysis, subscribers’ analysis of those passages, conference notices and reports, 
expository book reviews, course descriptions of informal logic courses, tests and examples of 
arguments, and so on. 
Volume 2.1 of the Newsletter marked the first theoretical turn by publishing Perry 
Weddle’s article (1979), “Inductive, deductive.” Johnson (2007) summarizes the consequence of 
the theoretical turn: 
 
(I)t was after, I think, the first year, which was mainly pedagogical, that Perry 
Weddle said, “I don’t know if you guys are interested in publishing articles, but I 
have an article.” And he said, “You know, I’m tenured, so I don’t have to publish 
anywhere I don’t please. And I would be pleased to publish with you.” It was 
about induction, deduction. And we thought, “Yeah, OK. It’s time for us to get a 
bit of theoretical cast into this.” So that began in, I think, it was volume 2, 
might’ve been volume 3, I can’t remember. The newsletter was turning more 
toward, or equally toward featuring theoretical pieces, you know, articles, like a 
journal. 
 
After Blair and Johnson published Weddle’s article, the Newsletter opened the door to theoretical 
issues, including induction-deduction distinction, analysis of fallacy and fallacy theory, 
principles of charity, and logical neutrality, just to name a few. It must be noted that a lot of 
pedagogical items appeared in the Newsletter during the five-year span because it regularly 
published example supplement for classroom use. However, also important is that the first 
volume had no critical reviews or articles. Blair and Johnson introduced these two categories in 
the second volume, thereby paving a way for gradual evolution of the Newsletter into a 
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journal-like periodical. The following table summarizes how many items were published in 
which categories of the Newsletter. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Items Published in Informal Logic Newsletter7 
volume pedagogy 
expository 
book/article review 
critical 
book/article review 
conference notices 
and reports 
article 
1 23 3 0 4 0 
2 47 1 3 5 7 
3 38 11 3 5 10 
4 66 5 1 6 13 
5 13 1 2 5 13 
 
While the increase in articles and critical reviews substantively demonstrates the 
theoretical turn of the Newsletter, attention must be drawn to how Blair and Johnson also 
rhetorically advocated the turn to the readers. When the Newsletter first published a theoretical 
piece by Weddle in volume 2.1, they (1979, p. 1) called for materials from the subscribers: 
 
We remind our readers that ILN is planned primarily as a clearing-house, for 
which we editors collect and dispense the materials sent to us by our readers. 
Please: submit to us articles, discussion notes, critical reviews, reports of 
conferences (past and upcoming), announcements, comments, and queries. We are 
in this venture to provide a service, but we depend on your supports. 
 
In this passage they emphasize theoretical issues, but along with more mundane items such as 
reports of conferences and announcements. In the following issue (volume 2.2), however, their 
theoretical turn comes to the fore more clearly when they state (1980a, p.1) as follows: 
 
(T)he editors continue to wish more submissions than we have been receiving. In 
particular, we would like to invite more discussion pieces, comments, short and 
long articles, critical reviews. 
What is happening is that the ILN is beginning to take of the form of a 
journal of informal logic – without abandoning the news-disseminating features of 
a newsletter.... 
We are giving serious thought to the idea of developing a panel of referees, 
on the basis that making the ILN a referred publication might encourage more 
                                                 
7 ‘Pedagogy’ includes examples for analysis, subscribers’ analysis of those examples, course descriptions, and 
examples supplements. ‘Expository book/article reviews’ are informative reviews and descriptions of textbooks, 
monographs, and journal articles. ‘Critical book/journal reviews’ take a critical look at the publication and are 
published in the category ‘CRITICAL REVEW’ in the Newsletter. ‘Conference notices and reports’ constitute one 
sub-category of mundane business items. Other sub-categories such as information about other journals and 
subscription renewal notice are disregarded in this table. ‘Articles’ include journal-like articles and responses to 
those articles. While Johnson and Blair emphasized the triad of theory, practice and pedagogy, this table disregards 
the second category and puts some items in article and others in pedagogy. For example, Robert Binkley’s (1981, pp. 
7-9) “A system of rational appraisal” is counted as a pedagogical item. 
8 Volume three of the Newsletter did not have example supplement. Instead, volume 4.1 and 4.3 had the supplement. 
It accounts for the decrease in the pedagogy category in volume three and increase in volume four. 
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submissions. 
 
In volume 2.3, Blair and Johnson (1980b, pp. 1-2) look back on the development of 
informal logic and invite more participation of the readers. 
 
This year also witnessed the introduction of two new features: articles and critical 
reviews. The response, particularly to the articles, has been excellent (more on 
that below), and we hope to continue to expand these features in the years to come. 
On the whole, then, we believe that the Newsletter has helped to promote the 
development of informal logic as an important and worthy enterprise and to that 
extent begun to realize the goal we had in mind when we began publication. 
As we look to the future, we hope to be able to continue publication of 
challenging articles on topics of interest to our readers and to follow the dialectic 
wherever it may lead. We plan more critical reviews of the burgeoning number of 
texts in this area and hope that we can count on our readers to submit such 
reviews for publication.... 
If the growth of informal logic is to continue, if informal logic is to 
become an ever more vital area of inquiry and research then it is crucial that those 
involved in this enterprise address themselves to important conceptual and 
theoretical issues....It is our hope that the Newsletter will be a prominent forum 
for the publication of such research and the development of new ideas. 
 
From these passages it is clear that Blair and Johnson want to push informal logic to the direction 
of theoretical inquiry rather than keeping it as a service course within philosophy. However, their 
advocacy was not met with total support of the community partly because of academic politics. 
They (1981a, pp. 1-2) report contributors’ concerns on the Newsletter serving as a forum for 
theoretical inquiries. While the contributors want to support ILN, they also want to publish their 
articles in other journals and let other philosophers recognize informal logic as a legitimate 
philosophical inquiry. Also, they want to have their own work taken seriously by the 
establishment of philosophy. Calling this situation as the “the double bind” of many potential 
contributors, they do not offer a clear solution to the situation. Instead, they declare (1983[sic]a, 
p. 2) to continue the same format of the Newsletter, publishing articles and critical reviews as 
well as informing more mundane business items. This way they attempted to satisfy both camps: 
those interested in theoretical inquiries in informal logic and those interested in a forum to 
exchange ideas for teaching and past and upcoming conferences. 
When Blair and Johnson held the SISIL, however, more people wanted to have serious 
intellectual/argumentative space in which they could engage in theoretical inquiry. In the final 
issue of the Newsletter, Blair and Johnson (1983f, p. 1) explain why they decided to convert the 
Newsletter into a journal. 
 
In the past two years, more and more space has been devoted to articles which, in 
our opinion, are good enough to have been published in full-fledged journals. The 
change in our name, then will reflect more accurately the character of the 
publication. 
A second motivation for the change is related to the first. We believe that 
people who might other wise inclined to send materials to the Informal Logic 
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Newsletter have been deterred from so doing by the fact that it was not a referred 
journal and hence they cannot gain credit on their c.v.’s for material published in 
ILN. 
These along with other considerations were given a thorough airing during 
the Second International Symposium on Informal Logic this past June, and your 
editors were persuaded that the time had come for change. 
 
The communication at the SISIL acted as the catalyst to start the peer-review journal Informal 
Logic, and it advanced research and inquiries on informal logic. However, it did not come 
without a cost. In New Essays in Informal Logic, Johnson and Blair (1994, pp. 4-5) recognize 
that the journal does not pursue the pedagogical mission of informal logic well. While teaching 
ideas or teaching supplements were regular features of the Newsletter, Informal Logic stopped 
publishing them. As a result, Informal Logic must have created the divide between theory and 
teaching practice at least in its early years9. 
 
3.2. SISIL and Informal Logic 
 
(P)apers [presented at the SISIL] were not published in book form, but many of 
them helped launch the new journal, Informal Logic, which, along with the 
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, was formed as a result of 
SISIL. (Johnson and Blair 1994, p. vii) 
 
As Johnson and Blair recognize, the SISIL contributed a great deal to early years of Informal 
Logic. The non-existence of the proceedings worked in their favor because, many presentations 
were not published, and thus they could count on good presentations to be published in the 
journal. In addition, publishing those presentations in the journal helped to reach out to a wider 
audience. Taking a look at presentations at the SISIL and Informal Logic in the 1980s, we can 
easily find the journal published many papers presented at SISIL. The following table 
summarizes which paper was or was not published in Informal Logic, based on Blair and 
Johnson’s (1983d, pp. 30-31; 1984a, p.2; 1984c, p. 2; 1984d, p.2; 1985, p.1) description. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Presentations at the SISIL and Their Publication Outlets 
Names presentation title at the SISIL article title publication outlet 
J. Anthony Blair and 
Ralph H. Johnson 
Informal logic: The last five 
years 
Informal logic: The past five 
years, 1978-1983 
American 
philosophical 
quarterly, 22.3, 
181-196, 1985. 
Trudy Govier Needed: A better theory of 
argument 
Is a theory of argument 
possible? 
Problems in argument 
analysis and 
evaluation, (13-36, 
Ch. 12) 
Robert Fogelin Logic of deep disagreements same title Informal logic 7.1, 
1-8, 1985. 
James Gough and 
Christopher Tindale 
‘Missing’ or ‘hidden’ premises? ‘Hidden’ or ‘missing’ Premises.  Informal logic 7.2/3, 
99-106, 1985. 
                                                 
9 Informal logic teaching supplement became a regular feature of the journal in volume 20.1 in 2000. 
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David Hitchcock Filling premise-gaps in 
arguments 
Enthymematic arguments Informal logic 7.2/3, 
83-97, 1985. 
John Hoaglund Typing ? ? 
John Nolt Possible worlds and 
imagination in informal logic 
same title Informal logic 6.2, 
14-17, 1984. 
Richard Paul Background logic: Its 
significance in informal logic 
Background logic, critical 
thinking, and irrational 
language games.  
Informal logic 7.1, 
9-18, 1985 
Seale Doss Three steps toward a theory of 
informal logic 
same title Informal logic 7.2/3, 
127-135, 1985. 
Perry Weddle On theory in informal logic same title Informal logic 7.2/3, 
119-126, 1985. 
Stephen Norris and 
Ruth King10 
Observational Ability: 
Determining and Extending its 
Presence 
same title Informal logic 7.2/3, 
119-126, 1985. 
Merrill Hintikka Informal Logic and 
Philosophical Expertise 
? ? 
Jaakko Hintikka Questioning as a philosophical 
method 
same title The logic of 
epistemology and the 
epistemology of logic: 
Selected essays 
(215-234, Essay 14), 
1989. 
George Yoos The Relationship of Rhetoric 
and Argument 
Rhetoric, argumentation and 
logic.  
Informal logic 6.3, 
10-16, 1984. 
Robert C. Pinto Dialectic and the Structure of 
Argument 
same title Informal logic 6.1, 
16-20. 
Maurice Finocchiaro Informal Logic and the Theory 
of Reasoning 
same title Informal logic 6.2, 
3-8, 1984 
Thomas Schwartz Reasoning about Explanation: 
Informal Logic and the Special 
Disciplines 
Arguing for Explanations: logic 
and the special disciplines 
Informal logic 6.1, 
10-15. 
John E. McPeck Some Philosophical Difficulties 
in Evaluating Critical Thinking 
Skills 
The evaluation of critical 
thinking programs: Dangers 
and Dogmas 
Informal logic 6.2, 
9-13, 1984. 
Robert Ennis Practical problems in testing 
informal logic competence 
Problems in testing informal 
logic / critical thinking / 
reasoning 
Informal logic 6.1, 
3-9. 
Michael Scriven New Frontiers in Informal 
Logic 
? ? 
 
Surprisingly, three-fourths of the presentations at the SISIL were published in Informal 
Logic. As an intellectual infrastructure, Informal Logic seemed to successfully attract researchers 
in the field because it is a regular, peer-review journal. While there is no evidence available 
about how many researchers benefited from the conversion of the newsletter into the journal, 
some concerns expressed by readers during the years of the newsletter seems to have been settled 
by the change. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 While there is no evidence to show that the journal article is based on the presentation, the author presumes it is 
the case because of the identical title of the presentation and the article.  
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4. Founding Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) 
 
The Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) was the other major 
achievement of the SISIL in terms of intellectual infrastructure. This organization has worked as 
an interest group for informal logicians to present papers at the regional meetings of American 
Philosophical Association, thereby helping their voices to be heard in a key intellectual space in 
North America.11 Given that the APA regional meetings are held every year, informal logicians 
could meet on a regular basis to maintain their discussion on theoretical issues on informal logic. 
In addition, they could attract audience members interested in informal logic to come to the panel. 
Whereas journal Informal Logic served as a forum to publish a written, refined article, AILACT 
promoted oral exchanges of intellectual ideas at academic conventions. 
Taking a look at the name of organization, people may well wonder why it included 
critical thinking as well as informal logic because the newsletter, journal, and symposium did not 
include the phrase critical thinking. For understanding how the name of the association came into 
being, we must attend to emerging relationship between informal logic and critical thinking since 
the FISIL and what happened during the SISIL in forming AILACT. Three key persons worth 
mentioning for us to understand the relationship are Robert Ennis, Perry Weddle, and Richard 
Paul. 
Before Blair and Johnson held the FISIL in 1978, Ennis got the information about it 
through his colleague at Southern Illinois University (Ennis 1977). He attended the FISIL, and 
through exchange with Johnson after the symposium, agreed to co-author a paper for the 
proceedings with Thomas N. Tomko (Ennis and Tomoko 1980). In a letter to Ennis after the 
Symposium Johnson (1978b) expressed his gratitude to Ennis for revising the bibliography that 
he and Blair prepared. He admitted that “(f)or both of us, one of the great things about the 
symposium was the discovery of your work, of which we had been previously unaware.” The 
encounter with Ennis introduced Blair and Johnson to a cognate or overlapping field of inquiry 
of critical thinking.12 
A second person worth mentioning is Perry Weddle, who, in Johnson’s opinion, was “one 
of the leading voices” in the politics of critical thinking (Blair and Johnson 2009). Like Johnson 
and Blair, he founded and edited Critical Thinking News (CT news), a newsletter that promoted 
critical thinking. He contacted Blair and John to see if they were interested in publishing 
“Inductive, deductive” in the Newsletter. As described in section 3.1 of this paper, his article 
marked the first theoretical turn of the Newsletter, which eventually led to conversion into 
Informal Logic. In the view of current editors of Informal Logic (Blair, Johnson, Hansen and 
Tindale 2005, p.78), he “was one of the first and most loyal supporters of Informal Logic.” When 
AILACT was founded, he served the first executive of the organization. 
                                                 
11 According to the regular procedures of the APA meetings, scholars can present a paper in two ways. One is to 
send a completed paper and have it accepted for presentation, and the other is to form an organization that sponsors 
a panel. Since not all philosophers were open to the scholarship on informal logic, it was not easy for informal 
logicians to send a completed paper and to have it accepted by philosophers who may not be doing informal logic. 
One reason AILACT was established was to manoeuvre through the situation. 
12 When the author presented this paper at the OSSA conference, Ennis commented on history of critical thinking 
that could be traced to John Dewey and even back to John Stuart Mill, and Scriven commented that teaching of 
critical thinking was fairly widespread among philosophers when he was at University of Minnesota, partly because 
of the work by Max Black (1946, 1952) and Monroe Beardsley (1950). While Johnson and Blair as well as Woods 
and Walton used the phrase ‘critical thinking’ in their writing in 1970s, it seems fair to say that they were not so 
familiar with books or articles by Dewey, Black, or Ennis. 
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Still another person bridging critical thinking and informal logic is Richard Paul. He was 
a fervent believer in critical thinking, key organizer of conferences held at Sonoma State 
University, and supporter of Informal Logic Newsletter and Informal Logic as a contributor. 
When he held the First National Conference on Critical Thinking, Moral Education and 
Rationality at Sonoma State University in 1981, Blair and Johnson respectively presented their 
own paper on application of informal logic to moral education and on media logic. By going to 
the Sonoma conference, Johnson (2007) thought: “(W)e saw that there was a connection between 
what was going on there and what we were doing. They’re not the same, but they’re related. We 
began to, you know, introduce ourselves and be introduced to a different population of people.” 
Paul (1982a, 1982b) also supported informal logic by refining his presentation on critical 
thinking in ‘strong’ sense at the first Sonoma conference and publishing it as well as a research 
agenda item for the informal logic and critical thinking movement in the Newsletter. Ennis, 
Weddle, and Paul all came and presented their papers at the SISIL and later published them in 
Informal Logic. 
Along with the emerging relationship with these critical thinking scholars, Blair and 
Johnson (1982a, pp. 1-2) recognized significance of critical thinking in university education and 
called Executive Order No. 338 (that require a critical thinking component for graduating from 
the California State University System) to attention of the readers of the Newsletter. By the time 
they held the SISIL, they had known a great deal about critical thinking through interacting with 
critical thinking scholars and recognized its significance. While they believed that informal logic 
had something to offer for critical thinking, they thought that these two might be overlapping but 
were different enterprises. 
Through the published documents, we can only know that AILACT was created (Blair 
and Johnson 1983g, 1984b). However, a close look at the authors’ oral history interviews with 
Blair (2007a), Johnson (2007), Hitchcock (2007), Pinto (2007), and Scriven (2007) suggests 
there was a debate about the naming of the association. When scholars discussed the name, three 
potential names were Associations for Informal Logic, Associations for Critical Thinking, or 
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking. Blair (2007a) and Johnson (2007) 
respectively remember that Paul pushed for the name Association for Critical Thinking. 
Hitchcock (2007) states that Paul lobbied for putting critical thinking along with informal logic 
as the name for the association. Truth is now in a grove – no one clearly knows how the debate 
developed and was settled, but people decided to have informal logic and critical thinking 
alongside with each other, without giving preference to one over the other. In retrospect, Johnson 
(2007) tells his version of the story in the following way: 
 
...the memorable thing there was the birth of AILACT. That was, I would say that 
that conference was…not dominated by…but a significant strand was informal 
logic, critical thinking - relationship between the two. I think it's fair to call – to 
say that Richard Paul is an imperialist, in the sense that he wanted critical 
thinking to be the driver of the bus. 
And there were a lot of us who were saying, “Sorry, if we're gonna work 
together, it’s gonna be as equals. We are not gonna work under the mantle of 
critical thinking, because that's not what we do. Although what we do is related to 
critical thinking, we do informal logic. So if we are gonna join forces, it's gonna 
be equals.” So we had that debate. Because Richard said, “Let’s just have an 
association for promotion for critical thinking.” And pretty soon people said, 
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“Nope.” And it was pretty clear he was not gonna win that discussion. Ennis was 
opposed, Scriven was opposed, Tony and I were opposed. He was pretty well on 
his own. 
 
Interviewing with more people who attended the SISIL, we can probably reconstruct a better 
overall picture of how informal logicians and critical thinking scholars developed and resolved 
the debate. How argumentation scholars enter into argumentative space and resolve difference of 
opinion will be a significant case analysis on theory and history of argumentation. 
As a result of the debate at the SISIL, AILACT came into existence, and it promoted 
scholarship on informal logic and critical thinking. Further investigation is necessary for us to 
know more about the exact benefit of the association – such as how many presentations were 
published in journal and became part of edited books or monographs. However, suffice it to say 
that the existence of the professional association must have made things easier for informal 
logicians and critical thinking scholars to present their ideas at key professional organization’s 
conventions. The following table contrastively summarizes nature and achievements of the FISIL 
and SISIL. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Summary of the FISIL and SISIL 
 FISIL SISIL 
When 26-28 June, 1978 20-23 June, 1983 
Length three days four days 
Keynoters n/a Jaakko Hintikka 
Sessions no concurrent sessions two concurrent sessions in some time 
slots 
Number of 
presentations 
eight (nine in the proceedings) twenty conference presentations; six 
workshop presentations 
Registrants 64 84 
Proceedings Informal logic: The first international 
symposium 
none (Informal logic published 15 of 20 
presentations) 
Key achievements Informal logic newsletter 
Informal logic: The first international 
symposium 
journal Informal logic 
AILACT (Association for Informal 
Logic and Critical Thinking) 
 
5. Informal Logic, Argumentation and Conference in Amsterdam in 1986 
 
The previous section of this article has observed interactions between informal logicians’ and 
critical thinking researchers’ communities. While there seems to be minor confrontations on 
leadership issues, it can be argued that it was a dispute within philosophers’ communities. This 
section will observe some emerging relationship between informal logicians on the one hand and 
communication scholars/rhetoricians and Pragma-Dialecticians on the other, and how Blair and 
Frans H. van Eemeren became two of the argumentation studies Big Four (including Rob 
Grootendorst and Charles Arthur Willard). 
Speech communication scholars and rhetoricians in the United States did a substantial 
amount of theoretical and practical studies of argumentation. However, Blair and Johnson did not 
notice most of them until 1980s. In light of the research environment of the 1970s and 80s before 
the arrival of the Internet, it is understandable that they did not read a lot of research by 
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non-philosophers. However, based on their limited exposure to the research done outside 
philosophy, Johnson (1978a) informed of the FISIL Douglas Ehninger, a well-known rhetorician 
at the University of Iowa, and he and Blair (1980, p. 17; 1978) referred to Ehninger’s Influence, 
Belief, and Argument in their presentation at the FISIL. In their joint interview with the author 
(Blair and Johnson 2009), they said that they had read some work by communication scholars 
and rhetoricians, but they viewed themselves as philosophers and wanted to make their case and 
deliver it to philosophers as their main target audience. Their remarks shows that informal logic 
was a disciplinary enterprise within philosophy, at least in early years. 
Interaction with communication scholars and rhetoricians increase over years, and Blair 
(2007b) credits Joseph Wenzel, a participants in the SISIL, for opening “the door into the 
communication field...for us.” After the SISIL, Blair and Johnson (1984e p. 47) posted an 
announcement in Informal Logic of Summer conference on argumentation co-sponsored by 
Speech Communication Association (SCA) and American Forensic Association (AFA), and Blair 
was eventually invited, after the Conference in Amsterdam in 1986, to one of the SCA/AFA’s 
Summer Conference on Argumentation. 
Although informal logicians started to realize the significance of the rhetorical 
perspective of argumentation, Blair (2007b) admits it took him more time to be open to the 
rhetorical perspective than the dialectical perspective. This is another topic for serious historical 
inquiry, but the author merely states here that informal logicians had to wait for a strong voice 
within by Tindale (1999) to fully understand the rhetorical perspective. 
Along with rhetorical and (informal) logical perspectives of argumentation, the dialectical 
perspective is another important approach. This perspective, particularly the one represented by 
Pragma-Dialectics, has been influential to the community of argumentation scholars. Around the 
same period when Blair and Johnson developed the informal logic movement, van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst started to build their refined Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation on the 
other side of the Atlantic Ocean, based on dialogue logic and Searlean speech act theory. Blair 
and Johnson (1983c, 1983e) noticed Eemeren and Grootendorst’s article (1982) on the speech act 
of arguing and convincing and expositorily introduce it to the readers of the Newsletter in 
volume 5.2.13 
What attracts our attention more than this introduction of the article, though, is how Blair 
and Johnson (1983c p. 2) talk about it in the ‘from the editors’ section of the same issue of the 
Newsletter. While they are aware of potential provincialism, they state that: “(w)orth reading in 
its own right, this article is also evidence that informal logic has a presence outside of North 
America, and it signals the need for all of us to become more familiar with work being done by 
colleagues in other parts of the world. We need to avoid, once again the dangers of being 
insular.” After publishing Manifest Rationality and contrasting informal logic and 
Pragma-Dialectics (Johnson 2000, pp. 309-320), Johnson would not equate the two approaches 
to argumentation. Neither would Blair do so, after knowing more about the theory as well as 
interacting with Eemeren and Grootendorst to host ISSA conference several times. Charitably 
read, this was the juncture when argumentation scholars around the world developed their own 
theories fairly independently, and when informal logicians fought for their identity within a fairly 
conservative (or rigorous) analytic philosophy tradition. So it is understandable that Blair and 
                                                 
13  Blair has some confused memory about when he first encountered the Pragma-Dialectical school of 
argumentation. While he and Johnson introduced the article by Eemeren and Grootendorst in volume 5.2 of the 
Newsletter published in June 1983, he states (2007a) in the interview that he did not know their work until 1985 
when he met them. 
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Johnson went overboard in equating the two in the early 1980s. 
Blair’s first encounter with Eemeren and Grootendorst happened in an unexpected way, 
as he (2007a) told an amusing story to the author: 
 
What I’m thinking…was our meeting up with van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the 
Amsterdam scholars who developed Pragma-Dialectical theory. That happened in 
1985.…Hitchcock and I met them in New York. They’d come over just to, just to 
visit New York and they happened to come to an APA meeting that had an 
AILACT session at it. And so Hitchcock and I went out with them and got drunk 
together. And they invited me to be on their – the board of what they…the society 
they created, the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA)14. 
And the idea was that I would try to encourage philosophers in North America to 
attend the conference that they were going to hold in Amsterdam in the following 
year, which I tried to do. 
 
According to Blair’s story, it is not clear why Eemeren and Grootendorst came to New York and 
how they started to work with Blair. His story suggests that they happened to be in New York at 
the time for some reason. However, two different sources of information – Hitchcock and 
Eemeren – provide us with a better picture of the encounter. 
When the author of this article talked casually with Hitchcock, the founding president of 
AILACT, during the OSSA conference in 2016 and followed up with personal correspondence, 
he told the following story. 
 
The meeting with van Emeren and Grootendorst took place at the AILACT 
session at the Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical 
Association, in New York City. Looking at the APA’s record of the locations of its 
Eastern Division meetings, I see that the 1983 meeting took place in Boston, the 
1984 meeting in New York, and the 1985 meeting in Washington.... The meeting 
took place at the New York Hilton Hotel in New York City. I would not have been 
on the AILACT program. (Hitchcock 2016) 
 
Eemeren and Grootendorst did not just happen to come to an APA meeting that 
had an AILACT session at it. They had written in advance to me, in my capacity 
as founding president of AILACT, to ask if they could present a paper at the 
AILACT session in New York. We already had a full program, whose participants 
(apart from me) had been chosen as a result of a call for papers and a refereeing 
procedure, so rather stupidly I said no but invited them to attend. They did so, and 
they used the occasion to announce the upcoming First International Conference 
on Argumentation, which was to take place in 1986. (Hitchcock 2016) 
 
Eemeren basically endorsed Hitchcock’s story. He and Grootendorst came to the APA 
meeting to make the 1986 conference to meet Hitchcock and Blair, and perhaps Richard Paul. 
Since they perceived some divisions among argumentation scholars in different disciplines, they 
                                                 
14 This part of the narrative about the foundation of ISSA is not historically accurate. According to Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Blair and Willard (1987, p. 3), ISSA was established at the end of the 1986 conference in Amsterdam. 
Blair was then approached to be the organizing committee of the 1986 conference, but not the ISSA. 
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wanted to bring people together, so approached Blair to be part of the team to convene an 
international conference on argumentation in Amsterdam. As a result of the interaction 
deliberately planned by Eemeren and Grootendorst, Blair become one of the convenors of the 
first international conference on argumentation in 1986, together with Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
and Willard. They held four Amsterdam conferences together in every four years. After 
Grootendorst’s death in 2000, the three served as convenors of the Conference until 2008. 
The significance of the 1986 conference in Amsterdam to informal logic and 
argumentation can never be emphasized too much. It was in Amsterdam that three perspectives 
of argumentation – logical, dialectical, and rhetorical as well as other approaches met together. It 
was in Amsterdam that argumentation as a field of inquiry became truly interdisciplinary. Blair 
(2007a) recognizes the consequences of the conference in bringing different perspectives 
together in the following way. 
 
Well, that connection [with Eemeren and Grootendorst] has led to…two things. A 
lot of philosophers...in the field [ended in] going over to Amsterdam on a regular 
basis. They have a conference – international conference every four years. There 
had six of them so far. The other thing we met at this conference all sorts of 
argumentation scholars who are not philosophers, whom we had known about, 
from the United States, from the speech communication community, but also from 
Europe and elsewhere. And so we became exposed to a larger scholarly 
community and then to the literature of this community. 
Another thing that happened was that, at least to me, I was invited, I guess, 
or encouraged to attend the biennial - one of the biennial conferences of the 
American Forensic Association and the National Communication Association 
meetings at Alta Utah every second summer. And there I got to know the 
members of the argumentation community within speech communication in the 
United States that - and so got exposed to that literature of that group of people. 
And I guess I tried to be a vehicle to that bring those influences back to informal 
logic. So people began to be aware of one another’s work. Now there is a lot of 
cross-field influence and interpenetration…and that went on before that I think 
led to a profusion of scholarship. 
 
If we limit our focus to Blair and Johnson’s scholarship, the cross-field influence, particularly 
from Pragma-Dialectics, is obvious. In response to Pragma-Dialectics or the dialectical 
perspective of argumentation, they (1987) published “Argumentation as dialectical” in the very 
first issue of journal Argumentation, in which they attempted to situate their RSA 
(relevance-sufficiency-acceptability) criteria of good argument within a dialectical framework. A 
profusion of scholarship that Blair refers to in the above story demands more careful attention 
and merits further research by theorists and historians of argumentation studies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Based on oral history interviews and some archival research, this article has examined 
development of informal logic in the early and mid-1980s. This has been the time when informal 
logicians started to influence and be influenced by other approaches to reasoning and 
argumentation, such as critical thinking, communication scholars and rhetoricians and 
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Pragma-Dialecticians. Blair and Johnson set up intellectual/argument space for other 
philosophers by convening the SISIL, converting a newsletter into a journal, establishing a 
professional association. In addition, their interaction with non-philosophers led to better 
understanding of argumentation theory and some modification of their original theoretical 
constructs. The author hopes that this article has met his own call (Konishi 2009, pp. 21-22) to 
investigate into the post-FISIL period, provide in-depth accounts of key events, and pay more 
attention to other communities than the informal logic movement. 
With the historical evidence at hand, the following issues need further clarification. First, 
it is still not clear how informal logicians and critical thinking scholars exchanged arguments 
about the naming of AILACT. Answering this question will require better understanding of 
similarities and differences between informal logic and critical thinking, as perceived by those 
participated in the discussion. Second, how did AILACT help develop informal logic, critical 
thinking, argumentation in philosophers’ communities? A close examination of publications by 
AILACT as well as the link between AILACT sessions at the APA meetings and publication of 
monographs and journal articles will substantiate actual consequence that the association brought 
about. Third, how did communities of informal logicians on the one hand and communication 
scholars and rhetorician on the other develop relationships? While it seems obvious that 
Pragma-Dialecticians influenced informal logicians including Blair, Johnson or Walton, 
influence by communication scholars and rhetoricians on informal logicians is less obvious and 
has come later than the dialectical perspective. What explains the delay? How did the 
historically-constructed tension between philosophy and rhetoric play a part? This may require 
more inquiry into history of ideas, but is worth serious consideration. Fourth, how did informal 
logicians and Pragma-Dialecticians form a relationship over years? While this paper has revealed 
the informal logic side’s historical account, Pragma-Dialecticians’ views are lacking. Their side 
of the story will better illuminate the historical process through which different perspectives 
interacted. Knowing more about these issues require further inquiry into argumentation in 
general, informal logic in particular. With apologies to omit the FISIL for lack of the evidence to 
back up the story, the author promises to continue this line of historical inquiry to let 
argumentation scholars in different disciplines know more about how things have become as they 
are in the first half of the 21st century. 
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